Apache HTTP Server Version 2.5

Apache > HTTP Server > Documentation > Version 2.5 > SSL/TLS

# SSL/TLS Strong Encryption: How-To

This document is intended to get you started, and get a few things working. You are strongly encouraged to read the rest of the SSL documentation, and arrive at a deeper understanding of the material, before progressing to the advanced techniques.

## Basic Configuration Example ¶

Your SSL configuration will need to contain, at minimum, the following directives.

    Listen 443
    <VirtualHost *:443>
        ServerName www.example.com
        SSLEngine on
        SSLCertificateFile "/path/to/www.example.com.cert"
        SSLCertificateKeyFile "/path/to/www.example.com.key"
    </VirtualHost>

## Cipher Suites and Enforcing Strong Encryption ¶

"Strong encryption" is, and has always been, a moving target. Furthermore, the definition of "strong" depends on your desired use cases, your threat models, and your acceptable levels of risk. The Apache HTTP Server team cannot determine these things for you.

For the purposes of this document, which was last updated in mid-2016, "strong encryption" refers to a TLS implementation which provides all of the following, in addition to the basic confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity protection that most users already expect:

- Perfect Forward Secrecy, which ensures that a compromise to a server's private key in the present does not compromise the confidentiality of past TLS communication.
- Protection from known attacks on older SSL and TLS implementations, such as POODLE and BEAST.
- Support for the strongest ciphers available to modern (and up-to-date) web browsers and other HTTP clients.
- Rejection of clients that cannot meet these requirements. In other words, "strong encryption" requires that out-of-date clients be completely unable to connect to the server, to prevent them from endangering their users. Whether or not this is appropriate for your situation is a decision that only you can make.

Please note that strong encryption does not, by itself, ensure strong security. (As an example, HTTP compression oracle attacks such as BREACH may require further steps to mitigate.)

- How can I create an SSL server which accepts strong encryption only?
- How can I create an SSL server which accepts many types of ciphers in general, but requires a strong cipher for access to a particular URL?

### How can I create an SSL server which accepts strong encryption only?

The following configuration enables "strong encryption", as defined above, and is derived from the Mozilla Foundation's Server Side TLS requirements:

    # "Modern" configuration, defined by the Mozilla Foundation's SSL Configuration
    # Generator as of August 2016. This tool is available at
    # https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/
    SSLProtocol         all -SSLv3 -TLSv1 -TLSv1.1
    # Many ciphers defined here require a modern version (1.0.1+) of OpenSSL. Some
    # require OpenSSL 1.1.0, which as of this writing was in pre-release.
    SSLCipherSuite      ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
    SSLHonorCipherOrder on
    SSLCompression      off
    SSLSessionTickets   off

- SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 are susceptible to known attacks on the protocol; they are disabled entirely.
- Disabling TLS 1.1 is (as of August 2016) mostly optional; TLS 1.2 provides stronger encryption options, but 1.1 is not yet known to be broken. Disabling 1.1 may mitigate attacks against some broken TLS implementations.
- Enabling `SSLHonorCipherOrder` ensures that the server's cipher preferences are followed instead of the client's.
- Disabling `SSLCompression` prevents TLS compression oracle attacks (e.g. CRIME).
- Disabling `SSLSessionTickets` ensures Perfect Forward Secrecy is not compromised if the server is not restarted regularly.

The exact ciphersuites supported in the `SSLCipherSuite` line are determined by your OpenSSL installation, not the server. You may need to upgrade to a modern version of OpenSSL in order to use them.

### How can I create an SSL server which accepts many types of ciphers in general, but requires a strong cipher for access to a particular URL?

Obviously, a server-wide `SSLCipherSuite` which restricts ciphers to the strong variants, isn't the answer here. However, `mod_ssl` can be reconfigured within `Location` blocks, to give a per-directory solution, and can automatically force a renegotiation of the SSL parameters to meet the new configuration. This can be done as follows:

    # be liberal in general -- use Mozilla's "Intermediate" ciphersuites (weaker
    # ciphersuites may also be used, but will not be documented here)
    SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:!DSS

    <Location "/strong/area">
    # but https://hostname/strong/area/ and below requires strong ciphersuites
    SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
    </Location>

## OCSP Stapling ¶

The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is a mechanism for determining whether or not a server certificate has been revoked, and OCSP Stapling is a special form of this in which the server, such as httpd and mod_ssl, maintains current OCSP responses for its certificates and sends them to clients which communicate with the server. Most certificates contain the address of an OCSP responder maintained by the issuing Certificate Authority, and mod_ssl can communicate with that responder to obtain a signed response that can be sent to clients communicating with the server.

Because the client can obtain the certificate revocation status from the server, without requiring an extra connection from the client to the Certificate Authority, OCSP Stapling is the preferred way for the revocation status to be obtained. Other benefits of eliminating the communication between clients and the Certificate Authority are that the client browsing history is not exposed to the Certificate Authority and obtaining status is more reliable by not depending on potentially heavily loaded Certificate Authority servers.

Because the response obtained by the server can be reused for all clients using the same certificate during the time that the response is valid, the overhead for the server is minimal.

Once general SSL support has been configured properly, enabling OCSP Stapling generally requires only very minor modifications to the httpd configuration — the addition of these two directives:

    SSLUseStapling On
    SSLStaplingCache "shmcb:ssl_stapling(32768)"

These directives are placed at global scope (i.e., not within a virtual host definition) wherever other global SSL configuration directives are placed, such as in `conf/extra/httpd-ssl.conf` for normal open source builds of httpd, `/etc/apache2/mods-enabled/ssl.conf` for the Ubuntu or Debian-bundled httpd, etc.

This particular `SSLStaplingCache` directive requires `mod_socache_shmcb` (from the `shmcb` prefix on the directive's argument). This module is usually enabled already for `SSLSessionCache` or on behalf of some module other than `mod_ssl`. If you enabled an SSL session cache using a mechanism other than `mod_socache_shmcb`, use that alternative mechanism for `SSLStaplingCache` as well. For example:

    SSLSessionCache "dbm:ssl_scache"
    SSLStaplingCache "dbm:ssl_stapling"

You can use the openssl command-line program to verify that an OCSP response is sent by your server:

    $ openssl s_client -connect www.example.com:443 -status -servername www.example.com
    ...
    OCSP response:
    ======================================
    OCSP Response Data:
        OCSP Response Status: successful (0x0)
        Response Type: Basic OCSP Response
    ...
        Cert Status: Good
    ...

The following sections highlight the most common situations which require further modification to the configuration. Refer also to the `mod_ssl` reference manual.

### If more than a few SSL certificates are used for the server

OCSP responses are stored in the SSL stapling cache. While the responses are typically a few hundred to a few thousand bytes in size, mod_ssl supports OCSP responses up to around 10K bytes in size. With more than a few certificates, the stapling cache size (32768 bytes in the example above) may need to be increased. Error message AH01929 will be logged in case of an error storing a response.

### If the certificate does not point to an OCSP responder, or if a different address must be used

Refer to the `SSLStaplingForceURL` directive.

You can confirm that a server certificate points to an OCSP responder using the openssl command-line program, as follows:

    $ openssl x509 -in ./www.example.com.crt -text | grep 'OCSP.*http'
    OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.example.com

If the OCSP URI is provided and the web server can communicate to it directly without using a proxy, no configuration is required. Note that firewall rules that control outbound connections from the web server may need to be adjusted.

If no OCSP URI is provided, contact your Certificate Authority to determine if one is available; if so, configure it with `SSLStaplingForceURL` in the virtual host that uses the certificate.

### If multiple SSL-enabled virtual hosts are configured and OCSP Stapling should be disabled for some

Add `SSLUseStapling Off` to the virtual hosts for which OCSP Stapling should be disabled.

### If the OCSP responder is slow or unreliable

Several directives are available to handle timeouts and errors. Refer to the documentation for the `SSLStaplingFakeTryLater`, `SSLStaplingResponderTimeout`, and `SSLStaplingReturnResponderErrors` directives.

### If mod_ssl logs error AH02217

    AH02217: ssl_stapling_init_cert: Can't retrieve issuer certificate!

In order to support OCSP Stapling when a particular server certificate is used, the certificate chain for that certificate must be configured. If it was not configured as part of enabling SSL, the AH02217 error will be issued when stapling is enabled, and an OCSP response will not be provided for clients using the certificate.

Refer to the `SSLCertificateChainFile` and `SSLCertificateFile` for instructions for configuring the certificate chain.

## Client Authentication and Access Control ¶

- How can I force clients to authenticate using certificates?
- How can I force clients to authenticate using certificates for a particular URL, but still allow arbitrary clients to access the rest of the server?
- How can I allow only clients who have certificates to access a particular URL, but allow all clients to access the rest of the server?
- How can I require HTTPS with strong ciphers, and either basic authentication or client certificates, for access to part of the Intranet website, for clients coming from the Internet?

### How can I force clients to authenticate using certificates?

When you know all of your users (eg, as is often the case on a corporate Intranet), you can require plain certificate authentication. All you need to do is to create client certificates signed by your own CA certificate (`ca.crt`) and then verify the clients against this certificate.

    # require a client certificate which has to be directly
    # signed by our CA certificate in ca.crt
    SSLVerifyClient require
    SSLVerifyDepth 1
    SSLCACertificateFile "conf/ssl.crt/ca.crt"

### How can I force clients to authenticate using certificates for a particular URL, but still allow arbitrary clients to access the rest of the server?

To force clients to authenticate using certificates for a particular URL, you can use the per-directory reconfiguration features of `mod_ssl`:

    SSLVerifyClient none
    SSLCACertificateFile "conf/ssl.crt/ca.crt"

    <Location "/secure/area">
    SSLVerifyClient require
    SSLVerifyDepth 1
    </Location>

### How can I allow only clients who have certificates to access a particular URL, but allow all clients to access the rest of the server?

The key to doing this is checking that part of the client certificate matches what you expect. Usually this means checking all or part of the Distinguished Name (DN), to see if it contains some known string. There are two ways to do this, using either `mod_auth_basic` or `SSLRequire`.

The `mod_auth_basic` method is generally required when the certificates are completely arbitrary, or when their DNs have no common fields (usually the organisation, etc.). In this case, you should establish a password database containing all clients allowed, as follows:

    SSLVerifyClient      none
    SSLCACertificateFile "conf/ssl.crt/ca.crt"
    SSLCACertificatePath "conf/ssl.crt"

    <Directory "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/secure/area">
        SSLVerifyClient      require
        SSLVerifyDepth       5
        SSLOptions           +FakeBasicAuth
        SSLRequireSSL
        AuthName             "Snake Oil Authentication"
        AuthType             Basic
        AuthBasicProvider    file
        AuthUserFile         "/usr/local/apache2/conf/httpd.passwd"
        Require              valid-user
    </Directory>

The password used in this example is the DES encrypted string "password". See the `SSLOptions` docs for more information.

### httpd.passwd

    /C=DE/L=Munich/O=Snake Oil, Ltd./OU=Staff/CN=Foo:xxj31ZMTZzkVA
    /C=US/L=S.F./O=Snake Oil, Ltd./OU=CA/CN=Bar:xxj31ZMTZzkVA
    /C=US/L=L.A./O=Snake Oil, Ltd./OU=Dev/CN=Quux:xxj31ZMTZzkVA

When your clients are all part of a common hierarchy, which is encoded into the DN, you can match them more easily using `SSLRequire`, as follows:

    SSLVerifyClient      none
    SSLCACertificateFile "conf/ssl.crt/ca.crt"
    SSLCACertificatePath "conf/ssl.crt"

    <Directory "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/secure/area">
      SSLVerifyClient      require
      SSLVerifyDepth       5
      SSLOptions           +FakeBasicAuth
      SSLRequireSSL
      SSLRequire       %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_O}  eq "Snake Oil, Ltd." \
                   and %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_OU} in {"Staff", "CA", "Dev"}
    </Directory>

### How can I require HTTPS with strong ciphers, and either basic authentication or client certificates, for access to part of the Intranet website, for clients coming from the Internet? I still want to allow plain HTTP access for clients on the Intranet.

These examples presume that clients on the Intranet have IPs in the range 192.168.1.0/24, and that the part of the Intranet website you want to allow internet access to is `/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/subarea`. This configuration should remain outside of your HTTPS virtual host, so that it applies to both HTTPS and HTTP.

    SSLCACertificateFile "conf/ssl.crt/company-ca.crt"

    <Directory "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs">
        #   Outside the subarea only Intranet access is granted
        Require              ip 192.168.1.0/24
    </Directory>

    <Directory "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/subarea">
        #   Inside the subarea any Intranet access is allowed
        #   but from the Internet only HTTPS + Strong-Cipher + Password
        #   or the alternative HTTPS + Strong-Cipher + Client-Certificate

        #   If HTTPS is used, make sure a strong cipher is used.
        #   Additionally allow client certs as alternative to basic auth.
        SSLVerifyClient      optional
        SSLVerifyDepth       1
        SSLOptions           +FakeBasicAuth +StrictRequire
        SSLRequire           %{SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE} >= 128

        #   Force clients from the Internet to use HTTPS
        RewriteEngine        on
        RewriteCond          "%{REMOTE_ADDR}" "!^192\.168\.1\.[0-9]+$"
        RewriteCond          "%{HTTPS}"       "!=on"
        RewriteRule          "."              "-"                      [F]

        #   Allow Network Access and/or Basic Auth
        Satisfy              any

        #   Network Access Control
        Require              ip 192.168.1.0/24

        #   HTTP Basic Authentication
        AuthType             basic
        AuthName             "Protected Intranet Area"
        AuthBasicProvider    file
        AuthUserFile         "conf/protected.passwd"
        Require              valid-user
    </Directory>

## Logging ¶

`mod_ssl` can log extremely verbose debugging information to the error log, when its `LogLevel` is set to the higher trace levels. On the other hand, on a very busy server, level `info` may already be too much. Remember that you can configure the `LogLevel` per module to suite your needs.